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11. Introduction1
"A game is being played whenever people interact with each other", Binmore (1992, p.3).
This statement implies that virtually  every sphere of human endeavour and activity can be
formulated as a game. If this is truly the case, then clearly game theory  is  worth exploring.
Binmore (1992) was, however, quick to point out that, this does not mean that game
theorists are the people to ask for answers for all the world's problems. The reason for this
word of caution  is that game theory, in its current state (what we refer to as traditional game
theory in this paper), is mostly about what happens when people interact in a rational2
manner. The big question is, do "real" people behave rationally in their day to day
interactions? Traditional game theory (TGT) does not answer this question (at least not
satisfactorily), nor does it give satisfactory justifications for the use of Nash equilibrium
(NE)3  in game theoretic models (Nash, 1951). The question of equilibrium selection is
another problem area for TGT. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) attempts to come to the
rescue of TGT by offering possible answers to the following questions:
(1)  Does evolution wipe out irrational behaviour, that is, do individuals who play    
dominated strategies get eliminated from the population in the long run?
(2) Can the process of iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies be    
justified by appealing to evolutionary processes?
(3) Can the use of Nash equilibria (Nash, 1951) be justified by appealing to an 
evolutionary process?
(4) Does evolution force coordination of the individual's rational actions?
(5) Can evolution lead to more refined notions such as subgame perfect equilibria?
(6) Does evolution resolve the problem of equilibrium selection?
(7) How does the evolution of cooperation emerge in repeated games?
(8) In static games, do evolutionary pressures lead to efficient equilibria?
Efforts at giving theoretically sound answers to questions (1) - (2), (3) - (5), and (6) - (7) are
what Van Damme (1994) classifies under the headings "Evolution of rationality",
"Evolution towards equilibrium" and "Evolution of norms" respectively. In this note, we
review some of the papers in the literature that address  these questions. The article is
intended  for those with background in economics  and familiar with traditional game theory
but not necessarily familiar with evolutionary game theory.  We will therefore  use concepts
from traditional game theory without first having to explain them. We attempt to highlight
the areas where the two branches of game theory converge, and more importantly, their
areas of divergence. The focus is on the contributions of evolutionary game theory to the
body of knowledge  at the disposal of the game theorist.  We do not attempt a highly
                                                  
1 The first author acknowledges support from the Research Council of Norway, the Programme of
Globalisation and Marginalisation.
2In game theoretic settings (and economic theory in general), a "decision-maker" is rational if he makes
decisions consistently in pursuit of his objectives. It is assumed that each player's objective is to maximise the
expected value of his own payoff, which is measured in some utility scales (Myerson, 1991).
3Recall that the basic idea of NE is, if a population as a whole is playing a NE, then unilateral deviations
cannot help a player.
2technical and detailed survey here.4 Our main objective is  to reach out to the numerous
economists and indeed, other social scientists, who are not as yet initiated in the basic
theory of  evolutionary games.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss certain basic
evolutionary game theory concepts.  We also discuss the attempts being made by
economists to extend and modify these basic concepts  so as to make it applicable  to the
analysis of social interactions, in which individuals are conscious and try to use available
information to their advantage.  We outline the main problems of traditional game theory
and review how the evolutionary game theoretic literature attempts to deal with them in
section 3. In section 4,  we discuss the possibility of applying evolutionary game theory in
the analysis of economic problems and issues. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Basic Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory came into existence with the work of Maynard Smith and Price
(1973)  which sought to explain why limited war behaviour is so prevalent among species
which possess lethal weapons. Prior to this pioneering work, it was mostly believed that
such limited war behaviour was due to group selection. Maynard Smith and Price (1973),
using game theory showed that this limited war behaviour could also be due to individual
selection. Since then, evolutionary game theory has been applied to several questions in
evolution and biology.
In general, an evolutionary process consists of two basic elements: a mutation mechanism,
which provides variety and a selection mechanism, which favours some varieties over
others (Weibull, 1995). In evolutionary games, the criterion of evolutionary stability
highlights the role of mutations, while that of replicator dynamics highlights the role of
selection. All these concepts are borrowed from biological game theory (Maynard Smith
and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982; Taylor and Jonker, 1978).
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)5 is robust to evolutionary selection pressures in an
exact sense. Following the discussion in Weibull (1995), suppose individuals are repeatedly
drawn at random from a large population to play a symmetric two-person game. Assume
further that initially all individuals are genetically or otherwise "programmed" to play a
certain pure or mixed strategy in this game. Now, let in a small population share of
individuals who are likewise "programmed" to play some other pure or mixed strategy.
Then the "incumbent" strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable if, for each such "mutant"
strategy, there exist a positive invasion barrier6 such that if the population share of
                                                  
4Interested readers are referred to Van Damme (1994), Banerjee and Weibull (1992), Hammerstein and Selten
(1993), Binmore and Samuelson (1993) and Mailath (1992), for more detailed reviews of evolutionary game
theory.
5See Hines (1987), and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) for good reviews of ESS.
6A strategy  DÎx has an invasion barrier if there exists some )1,0( Îye such that inequality (2.1) holds for
all strategies xy ¹ and every ( )yee ,0 Î .
3individuals playing the mutant strategy falls below this barrier,  then the incumbent strategy
earns a higher payoff than the mutant strategy. Formally,
Definition 2.1 A strategy x Î D is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for every
strategy  xy ¹ there exists some )1,0( y Îe such that
(2.1) ( ) ( )xyxy yuxu )) 1(,1(, eeee -+>-+
holds for all ),0( yee Î .
In the above definition  DÎx denotes incumbent strategy and DÎy denotes mutant
strategy; e  Î  (0,1)  is the share of mutants in the post-entry population; u(x,y) is the payoff
to strategy x when played against strategy y; and D denotes the simplex of mixed strategies.
Inequality (2.1) states what biological intuition suggests: evolutionary forces select against
the mutant strategy if  and only if its post-entry payoff (i.e., fitness) is lower than that of the
incumbent strategy. Now, let DESS  be the set of evolutionarily stable strategies in the game
under study, and DNE , the set of symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies.  It can easily be
shown that  (Weibull, 1995):
(2.2) DESS Ì DNE
The criterion of ESS, however, requires more than just the condition (2.2). For if x is
evolutionary stable, and y is an alternative best reply to x, then x has to be a better reply to y
than y itself. Hence, a strategy x Î D  is evolutionarily stable if and only if it meets the "first"
and "second" order best reply conditions given in (2.3) and (2.4) below.
(2.3) y ),(),( "£ xxuxyu
(2.4) x.y ),(),(  ),(),( ¹"<Þ= yxuyyuxxuxyu
Inequality (2.3) and (2.4) characterise evolutionary stability as originally defined (Maynard
Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982). Inequality (2.3) shows that  (x,x) is a
Nash equilibrium if x is an ESS, and because of (2.4) the set of ESS is a subset of the set of
symmetric Nash equilibria. In fact, every ESS induces a proper and (hence, perfect)
equilibrium (Van Damme, 1987, Theorem 9.3.4).
A number of points should be noted about the criterion of evolutionary stability. Firstly, the
issue of rationality does not arise in this set up. Secondly, this criterion refers implicitly to a
close connection between the payoffs in the game and the  stability of an incumbent
strategy in a population. The payoffs are supposed to directly reflect biological "fitness",
usually taken to mean the expected  number of surviving offsprings. Thirdly, just as with
Nash equilibrium, the evolutionarily stable property does not explain how a population
arrives at such a strategy. This is a very important issue and we discuss this a little further in
4the next few paragraphs. Instead, it asks whether once reached, a strategy is robust to
evolutionary pressures. In this regard, one can say that this criterion does not add much to
the concept of Nash equilibrium. Fourthly, despite its biological stance, evolutionary
stability also provides a relevant robustness criterion for human behaviours in a wide range
of situations, including of course, many interactions in the realm of economics (Weibull,
1995). Fifthly, this criterion is somewhat too stringent, hence, the formulation of weaker
evolutionary stability criteria such as neutral stability (Maynard Smith, 1982), which
requires that no mutant earns more than the incumbent, as against, all mutants must earn
less than the incumbent in ESS, and robustness against equilibrium entrants (Swinkels,
1992), which requires that no mutant earns the maximal payoff possible.7
An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) is said to have
dynamic stability if, when the values of the evolutionary parameters are perturbed so that
the community strategy is displaced from the ESS strategy, the force of natural selection
will restore the ESS. Most of the classical literature on evolutionary games does not address
the issue of dynamic stability of an ESS under the influence of natural
selection. This may be largely due to the inherent complexity of the problem of  evolution
through natural selection. The phenomenon that an ESS may not be stable under the
process of dynamic selection was first noted by Eshel and Motro (1981) who put forth the
concept of continuously stable strategy (CSS). This concept has been used by several
authors in addressing the issue of dynamic stability (see for example Eshel et. al., 1997;
Eshel, 1996; Taylor, 1989; Lessard, 1990; Nowak, 1990; Christiansen, 1991; Metz et. al.,
1996;  Geritz et. al., 1998; Kisdi, 1999 and references therein).
Initially, it was generally believed that a strategy that is a CSS  may be predicted to be the
outcome of evolution through dynamic selection. However, some recent articles using a
concept of evolutionary stability called evolutionary stable neighborhood invader strategy
(ESNIS) discovered that there are CSSs that may not be the outcome of evolution through
dynamic selection (Apaloo, 1997a, 1997b; Kisdi and Meszena, 1993, 1995; Ludwig and
Levin, 1991; Lessard, 1990; Geritz et. al., 1998;  Kisdi, 1999).
Geritz et. al. (1998) using the four evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, convergence
stability, neighborhood invader strategy (NIS), and protected dimorphisms)  provide a
general framework for modelling adaptive trait dynamics. These four concepts are largely
known to be independent of each other but we note that a strategy which is a NIS is also
convergence stable (Apaloo, 1997a). However a strategy which is convergence stable need
not be a NIS. It has been shown that a strategy which is a CSS may not be the outcome of
evolution through dynamic selection even if no polymorphisms occur. This result is shown
to be valid in single species evolution with a one-dimensional strategy chosen from a
continuum. On the other hand, it has been shown that an ESNIS will be the outcome of
evolution through dynamic selection if no polymorphisms occur (Apaloo, 1997a, and
references therein).
                                                  
7See Weibull (1994) and Swinkels (1992) for more on neutral stability and robustness against equilibrium
entrants.
5Geritz et. al (1998) and Kisdi (1999) have provided some detailed account of trait dynamics
in the neighborhood of an evolutionary singular point that is convergence stable but not an
ESS in a monomorphic population. They show that such singular points lead to the
occurrence of polymorphisms. They also extend the analysis to polymorphic populations.
But even in the simple monomorphic population evolution, two traits in the opposite sides
of an ESNIS may coexist. Appearance  of a third trait results in an ecological dynamics
involving three strategies whose outcome may be illusive. Note that these three strategies in
the neighborhood of an ESNIS (thus a CSS) may have the kind of pairwise relationships
given in the example on page 652 in Strobeck (1973) and therefore stable coexistence of the
three strategies may be possible. It is not hard to see that predicting the outcome of trait
dynamics is not an easy task.   We note here that the literarature on evolutionary game
theory in the biological context is rather large. We refer the reader to two good review
articles by Lessard (1991) and Eshel (1996)
Note that so far we have been dealing with monomorphic populations. Now assume a
polymorphic population and let nx(t) be the number of x-individuals at time t. Then, one
period later, the number of x1-individuals in discrete time is given by
(2.5) ( )),(1)()1( 111 xxuptntn x xxx å+=+
where px =px(t) denotes the probability of meeting x-types or the fraction of such a type in
the population. The continuous time equivalent of (2.5) can be written as (Van Damme,
1994)
(2.6) & ( ),n n u xx x p1 1 1=
where u x p p u x xxx( , ) ( , )= å  denotes the expected fitness of the x-types in the population
characterised by p. Let n nxx= å  and differentiate the identity pxn=nx to obtain the
following dynamics for population proportions
(2.7) ( ) x ),(),( "-= ppupxupp xx&
where u p p p u x pxx( , ) ( , )= å  denotes the average fitness of the population. Equation (2.7)
is the famous replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). This equation says that
strategies grow in the population if they do better than average, else they get slowly wiped
out with time. It can be seen that Nash equilibrium is a stationary point of the dynamical
system. Conversely, each stable stationary point is a Nash equilibrium, and as shown by
Bomze (1986), an asymptotically stable8 fixed point is a perfect equilibrium. Indeed, if
                                                  
8A strategy x Î D is asymptotically stable if (1) x is Lyapunov stable, that is, if small perturbations do not
disturb the stationarity of x; and (2) There is a neighbourhood W of x such that if the initial state is in W, then
the state x(t) converges to x as t ® ¥ .
6inheritance of mixed strategies are allowed then asymptotically stable fixed points of the
replicator dynamics corresponds exactly to ESS (Bomze and Van Damme, 1992; Hines
1980; Zeeman, 1981). However, if only pure strategies are inherited, being an ESS is
sufficient, but not necessary for asymptotic stability (Taylor and Jonker, 1978).
Clearly, the replicator dynamics as given by equation (2.7) may be inadequate for modeling
social interactions. For one thing, individuals possess some consciousness and try to use
information to their advantage, and for another, cultural evolution through learning,
imitation and experimentation may be governed by a different law of motion (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Selten, 1991). Also, utility and profits in economics are not the same as
reproductive fitness in biology, and the assumption of uniform random matching that
underlines the replicator equation may be appropriate only in a limited number of economic
contexts. Due to these problems, there is general consensus among economists that
considerable amounts of technical development of these ideas and concepts must precede
their applications in economics. Gladly, we can say that efforts in this direction have already
produced some useful results (See for instance, Basu, 1988, 1990; Bomze, 1986; Nachbar,
1990; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Fudenberg and Kreps,
1989; Friedman, 1991).
The basic model deals only with two-person, symmetric, static interactions. Clearly, this is a
significant limitation of the model, since an asymmetric context with different populations
appears to be more appropriate in economic contexts. Selten (1980), showed that, in an
asymmetric context, the conditions analogous to (2.3) and (2.4) can be justified only at a
strict Nash equilibrium.9 It is, however, known that many games do not admit such
equilibria, hence, they fail to have ESS. As a way to bypass this problem, concepts with
better existence properties have been developed: Maynard Smith (1982) introduced the
notion of neutrally stable strategy (NSS), which even though a weaker notion, has better
existence properties. Furthermore, set-valued concepts have also been introduced (Thomas,
1985) for the same reason.
(corrected)
Definition 2.2 X Ì  D  is an  Evolutionarily  Stable (ES) set  if it is nonempty and closed
and each x Î X has some neigbhorhood U such that u(x,y) ³ u(y,y) for all y  Î  U, with
strict inequality if y Ï X.
Yet another problem of the basic model is that, (2.4) might be a too stringent requirement in
economic contexts, since it requires stability against all mutants, including "stupid" ones.
When mutants arise through conscious experimentation, stupid mutants are unlikely to be
introduced in the population, we might therefore be satisfied if only stability against
"sensible" mutants are guaranteed.
                                                  
9Strict Nash equilibrium requires that any unilateral deviation actually incurs a loss. In a non-strict Nash
equilibrium, at least one player is indifferent between some of his pure strategies even under his Nash
equilibrium beliefs. Such indifference can make the equilibrium highly "unstable".
7Definition 2.3  (Swinkels, 1992) "Sensible" mutants can be described as best responses to
the "perturbed" population in which they are present in small numbers, and an
equilibrium evolutionarily stable strategy (EES) is a strategy that is stable against such
mutants. 10
3. The Relationship Between Traditional and Evolutionary Game Theory
The relationship between the two types of game theory can be likened to the tension
between the "mathematical" and the "economic", one between the normative and the
descriptive, as described by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p.62-3). Traditional game theory would
then be the normative, showing how agents should act if they wish to achieve certain aims,
and evolutionary game theory, the descriptive, showing how they actually behave. One can
claim that the key to traditional game theory's hegemony is the concept of Nash
equilibrium.11 In fact, given the results so far obtained by evolutionary game theorists
(Bicchieri, 1989; Basu, 1988, 1990; Bomze, 1986; Nachbar, 1990; Samuelson and Zhang,
1992; Cabrales and Sobel, 1992; Banerjee and Weibull, 1992; Van Damme, 1987;  Kandori,
Mailath and Rob, 1993, Fudenberg and Maskin, 1991), the same can be said about EGT,
that is, the concept of Nash equilibrium is central to it. While TGT gives a normative
statement of Nash equilibrium, EGT attempts to give a descriptive justification of the
concept, this then is one of the main differences between the two game theories.
The ascendancy of NE is probably due to the fact that it is an embodiment of the idea that
economic agents are rational, and that they act simultaneously to maximise their utility. In
this way NE embodies the most important and fundamental idea of economics (Aumann,
1985). Ironically, these very ideas of rationality and utility maximisation that EGT has
exploited in order to establish itself as a separate and legitimate discipline. TGT simply
assumes rationality, without giving good justifications for such assumptions. EGT, on the
other hand, attempts to justify rationality through evolution, adaptation, experimentation,
imitation, and learning.
The assumption of rationality and "common knowledge of rationality" inherent in TGT is
not enough to generate NE behaviour (Banerjee and Weibull, 1992). In games with a
dynamic structure, the very notion of rationality becomes problematic and common
knowledge of rationality may even lead to logical contradictions (Rosenthal, 1981; Binmore,
1987; Bicchieri, 1989; Basu, 1988, 1990). EGT approaches this problem by asking the
question, do economic agents behave "as if"  they meet the stringent rationality and
coordination assumptions inherent in TGT and the NE concept? The process of natural
selection is one of the processes used to justify the "as if" approach. The main question
                                                  
10Swinkels (1992), also gives the set valued analogue of this concept.
11The justification for this claim may be found by noting comments made by giants in the field. For instance,
Kreps (1990, p.1), notes that nowadays one cannot find a field of economics, finance, accounting, marketing,
or even political science, in which understanding the concept of Nash equilibrium is not nearly essential. Tirole
(1988) states that Nash equilibrium is "the basic solution concept in game theory". Rasmusen (1989), writes
"Nash equilibrium is so widely accepted that the reader can assume that if a model does not specify which
equilibrium concept is being used then it is Nash".
8here is, does evolutionary selection among more or less boundedly "rational" behaviours in
strategic interaction situations lead to NE? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative,
then one can claim that whether or not players are genuinely "rational" and "co-ordinate
their beliefs", in the long run they will behave as if they met the underlying rationalistic
assumptions (Weibull, 1994).
A second approach to the justification of NE is through the use of evolutionary adaptation.
In the basic dynamic setting of evolutionary adaptations, one imagines pairwise and
randomly matched interactions in a large population of individuals, each interaction taking
the form of play of a symmetric and finite two-player game. This approach lends strong
support to the NE concept in such low-dimensional 2x2 symmetric games. Unfortunately,
this result does not extend to general kxk games, because the evolutionary selection process
in higher-dimensional spaces do not converge. However, the good news is, just as in the
2x2 case, if evolutionary selection induces no movement in the composition of a
population's aggregate behaviour, and that behaviour is dynamically robust with respect to
small perturbations, then it is compatible with the stringent rationality and coordination
hypotheses in the rationalistic justification of NE behaviour. Bomze (1986), summarises this
results in the proposition given below.
Proposition 3.1 (Bomze, 1986): If the population state x is (Lyapunov) stable in the
replicator dynamics (2.7), then (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium. If (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium,
then x is stationary in the replicator dynamics.
Just as in the 2x2 case, if the population state converges from an initial state in which all
strategies are used, then the limiting state has to be a Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 3.2 (Nachbar, 1990): If an interior dynamic path in the replicator dynamics
(2.7) converges to some x Î  D , then (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 implies that every strictly dominated strategy is wiped out from the
population provided all strategies are represented in the initial population and that the
induced dynamic path converges.
Samuelson and Zhang (1992) went ahead to show that even when aggregate behaviour does
not converge, all strictly dominated strategies will nevertheless be wiped out of the
population.
Proposition 3.3 (Samuelson and Zhang, 1992): If a pure strategy is not rationalizable12,
then its population share converges to zero along any interior path in the replicator
dynamics (2.7).
It is worth noting that it is not all smooth sailing for the three propositions stated above. For
instance, Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) show, by way of an example, that proposition 3.3
                                                  
12See Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) for definition of rationalizable strategies.
9does not generally carry over to the discrete counterpart of the continuous time replicator
dynamics. However, Cabrales and Sobel (1992) pointed out that the reason why the
example of Dekel and Scotchmer works the way it does is not temporal discreteness per se,
but the special form it is given. They went ahead to show that if the time discretization is
made sufficiently  "fine", such that only a small batch of individuals change strategy each
time, then proposition 3.3 still stands, and all strictly dominated strategies are wiped out
along all interior solution paths.
One class of dynamics that has been widely used in the literature is monotone dynamics, its
popularity stems from the fact that it is a class of evolutionary dynamics that is wide enough
in scope to handle plausible social interaction processes. It has the property that if some
pure strategy earns more than another, then the first sub-population grows at a higher rate
than the second. The replicator dynamics belongs to this class, but the difference now is that
one may interpret monotone dynamics in terms of infinitely lived, boundedly rational
individuals who consciously choose their strategy, or rather, revise their choice of strategy
with time.
It can easily be shown that, in the special case of 2x2 games, the qualitative results of the
replicator dynamics are shared by all monotone dynamics (Weibull, 1992). This implies that
aggregate behaviour always converges to NE in these low-dimensional settings.
Furthermore, it is possible to show that, even for arbitrary symmetric kxk games, many
properties of the replicator dynamics are valid for any monotone dynamics (see Barnejee
and Weibull, 1992).
We now summarize  the discussion so far and give a hint on the direction it will take from
now on. The concept of ESS was discussed in the first part of section 2, followed by a
statement of the replicator dynamics equation. Note that in the case of the ESS, there is no
dynamics, hence, the concept is a static one. With the replicator dynamics, however, there is
explicit dynamics with only one-shot perturbation of stationary points, but explicit
mutations are excluded. In what follows, we discuss noisy evolution, first introduced by
Foster and Young (1990). Here, both explicit dynamics and mutations are included. Noisy
evolution is synonymous with stochastic EGT, while ESS and the replicator dynamics are
deterministic.
Foster and Young (1990) introduced the discussion on stochastic EGT by adding a
stochastic term to the continuous replicator dynamics. Their motivation stemmed from the
observation that the ESS criterion does not capture the notion of long-run stability in a
stochastic dynamical system. They saw a limitation in the assumption of the ESS criterion,
where each perturbation is treated as if it were an isolated event: in reality a system is
continually being subjected to perturbations that arise through mutations, such that over the
long run, it is likely that some succession of perturbations will accumulate and kick the
system out of any immediate locus of an ESS. Their major point is to show that the
introduction of stochastic effects may qualitatively change the asymptotic behaviour of an
evolutionary system.
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Traditional game theory has not been successful in explaining how players know which NE
is to be played if a game has multiple and equally plausible NE. The question of equilibrium
selection is so troublesome that it deserved mention by Kreps (1990) as one of the problems
of TGT. In our view stochastic EGT appears to offer the greatest opportunity of solving this
problem. Foster and Young (1990) were the first to argue that in games with  multiple
equilibria and therefore multiple ESS, some equilibria are more likely to emerge than others
in the presence of continual small stochastic shocks. This point was apparently taken
seriously by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993). In their paper they introduced a discrete
framework to address the issue of equilibrium selection, and developed a technique for
determining the most likely or long-run equilibrium. They went ahead to implement their
technique on coordination games, where they show that for this kind of games, the long-run
equilibrium coincides with the risk dominant equilibrium  of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). A
follow up to the work of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) is Ellison (1993). This paper
among other things, concentrated on the rate of convergence of dynamical systems. Ellison
rightly pointed out that in economic applications the rate of convergence of play to its long
run limit, may be the main measure of the relevance of the evolutionary forces causing the
convergence. In this regard, they came to two conclusions. First, the nature (local or global)
of interactions in a population is a crucial determinant of play. Second, when interactions
are local, the evolutionary arguments of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) may be
reasonably applied to large populations.
Another interesting contribution in this direction is Young (1993a): Consider an n-person
game that is played repeatedly, but by different agents. Young applies a technique which
defines a stochastic process that, for a large class of such games, converges almost surely to
a pure strategy NE or what is called "convention" in the paper. If the players in the game
sometimes make mistakes or experiment, then the society occasionally switches from one
convention to another. As the chance of making mistakes goes to zero, only some
conventions, known as stochastically stable equilibria, have a positive probability in the
limit.
 4.  Some Possible Application Areas
With its emphasis on "as if" rationality, imitation, learning and evolutionary trial-and-error
processes involving players that are boundedly rational, we can foresee great potential in the
application of evolutionary game theory in the analysis of problems in economics and
related subject areas, in general. In particular, we see EGT to be of relevance to the study of
both economic under-development and natural resource management. How this prediction
will materialise and the form it will take, we do not know at the moment, but the potential is
clearly there. For instance, it is not too difficult to see that evolutionary game theory can be
used profitably in the analysis of the behaviour of agents in a market for transferable fishing
quotas. It is possible to envisage a market  equilibrium with one big survivor, constituting
the fittest among the agents and a number of small survivors. The existence of certain
locally based advantages such as good proximity to a village fish market or access to some
valuable but small stocks of certain species of fish, could be possible reasons for the
survival of the latter group of fishers in such a scenario.
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Another possible application: consider a group of commercial fishing companies, all
operating in the same habitat, say the Barents Sea. Assume that each of them is boundedly
rational, that is, they are myopic and have short memories; naive and perform very little
optimization exercise; have no knowledge of the stock sizes or stock dynamics of the fishes
they exploit; and have little ability to observe rival actions and their consequences.  Assume
further that to decide what fishing effort to exert in any fishing period, all that a typical
agent does is to note the marginal profit he earned in the preceding period, if this turns out
to be positive, then he adjusts his effort level positively, if, on the other hand, his marginal
profit turns out to be negative, he will decrease his effort level, and keeps his preceding
period fishing effort unchanged if this marginal profit is zero. It is possible to formalise this
problem to show that such a group of fishers may evolve, pushed by evolutionary forces, to
(possibly) a unique Nash equilibrium in the long run.
5. Concluding Remarks
Two features of evolutionary game theory as opposed to traditional game theory emerges
from this survey. First, players are not assumed to be so "rational" or "knowledgeable"  as
to be in a position to anticipate the other player's choices correctly. Second (and instead), an
explicit dynamic process is specified which describes how players adjust their choices over
time as they learn from experience about other players choices and the structure of the
game itself. Thus the EGT approach tries to explain how an equilibrium is reached based on
trial-and-error learning instead of introspective-type arguments as advanced in traditional
game theory.
One can divide the development path of EGT into two phases. Phase one would then be
concerned with the theoretical and technical development of the discipline, while the second
phase will be concerned with both the application in economic contexts, and the further
theoretical and technical development of the field. The discussion in sections 2 and 3 show
that phase one has already reached an advanced stage. And indications are that phase two
has already taken off. A solid indication of this is the work of Young (1993b), where
individuals from two different populations (landlords and tenants in their model) of
bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash bargaining game. We believe it is time  to
give momentum to applications of evolutionary game theory in the analysis of economic
problems, in particular, environmental and natural resource management problems.
12
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Summary
This note reviews the game theoretic literature with the aim
of highlighting the similarities and dissimilarities between
what we term traditional game theory and evolutionary game
theory. The focus is on the contributions of evolutionary game
theory to the body of knowledge  at the disposal of the game
theorist. The note  is intended  for people with interests in
economics and  who are familiar with traditional game theory
but not necessarily familiar with evolutionary game theory.
The main objective is to reach out to the numerous economists
and indeed, other social scientists, who are not as yet initiated
in the basic theory of  of evolutionary games. A major
conclusion of this note is that, applications of evolutionary
game theory in the analysis of economic problems, especially,
in the areas of natural, environmental and development
economics are long overdue.
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